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INTRODUCTION
In Alden v. Maine, the United States Supreme Court entangled
itself in yet another extra-textual quagmire by importing notions of
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity into cases brought in state
court.1 Page after page of historical conceptions of state dignity
merely begged the real (and insufficiently addressed) question: by
what constitutionally-bestowed power did Congress force the State of
1. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
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Maine to hear a federal cause of action without its consent? 2 A wiser
jurisprudential approach to deciding Alden would have been to "start
with first principles," and explicitly recognize that "[t]he Constitution
creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers." 3 Having just
decided New York v. United States4 and Printz v. United States,5 the
anti-commandeering principle was particularly apropos to the
occasion: the federal government unequivocally lacks the power to
press state courts into federal service. A careful reading of case law
reveals that nothing in the Testa6 line of cases or the Supremacy
Clause7 alters the essential postulates of the anti-commandeering
doctrine with respect to state judiciaries. In fact, as discussed below,
all of the same rationales for barring federal usurpation of state
political branch powers apply with equal force to commandeering the
state judiciary.
Part I of this article frames the debate by revisiting the tumultuous
history of the Eleventh Amendment and the misgivings of Alden v.
Maine, which incorporated Eleventh Amendment limitations of
federal judicial power into state court sovereign immunity
jurisprudence. Part II provides the background principles of anti-
commandeering articulated in New York and Printz, which Alden
failed to integrate in the state judicial sphere. Part III advocates for
adopting an alternative approach to sovereign immunity claims made
in state court. The anti-commandeering principle articulated in New
York and Printz, rather than textually and logically inapplicable
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, should guide future cases of
congressional abrogation of state immunity.8 State judiciaries, no less
2. Throughout this article, every claim, suit, or action against a state or
immunity-claiming defendant involves a demand for retrospective, monetary relief
unless otherwise noted. Also, any federal cause of action is assumed to provide its
own cause of action independent of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to avoid extended discussion
of the limits inherent in that statute.
3. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (emphasis added).
4. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
5. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
6. See infra note 83.
7. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
8. A similar plea was made prior to Alden in Richard Seamon's insightful
article, The Sovereign Immunity of States in Their Own Courts, 37 BRANDEIS L.J.
319 (1998), which necessarily did not seek to criticize the yet-to-be-decided Alden
3
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than state legislatures and state executive officials, should not be
forced to throw open their courtroom doors, unless already opened, to
carry out Congress's policy objectives. Using the illustrative tool of
hypothetical statutes, Part IV sketches the implications of applying an
anti-commandeering analysis to requiring states to adjudicate federal
claims that would otherwise be barred by neutral state law. To negate
the argument that anti-commandeering would lead to a parade of
apocalyptic constitutional violations, Part V details avenues open to
litigants barred from asserting federal law claims in state court to sue
in federal court in accord with current Eleventh Amendment
constraints.
I. A Focus ON STATES' RIGHTS: ALDEN V. MAINE AND ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Emulating a past strategy of protecting rights derived from so-
called constitutional penumbras, 9 Alden concluded that the Eleventh
Amendment embodies "background principles" ratified at the
Constitution's founding unencumbered by the limited textual reach of
the Amendment itself. l° A far cry from the scenario in Chisholm v.
Georgia11 that triggered the expedient adoption of the Eleventh
Amendment, later Supreme Court cases have expanded the types of
parties and causes of action that strip federal courts of their ability to
hear cases against non-consenting states.12 Essentially eschewing any
case. Some of the arguments in this article echo principles expounded in Professor
Seamon's article, although with substantial departures from his methodology and
reasoning along the way.
9. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965) ("[S]pecific
guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those
guarantees that help give them life and substance."). At least four current Supreme
Court Justices see the similarity. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.
v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 665 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (complaining
the "expansion of the judge-made doctrine of sovereign immunity is unpredictable;
its dimensions are defined only by the present majority's perception of
constitutional penumbras rather than constitutional text' (emphasis added)).
10. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
11. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 420 (1793) (holding the federal judicial
power extends to a suit against a state brought by a citizen of another state). See also
infra note 15 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
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notion of fidelity to textually-bounded interpretations, the Supreme
Court announced for the first time in Alden, over vigorous dissent, that
Eleventh Amendment principles apply not just in federal courts, but in
state courts as well.13 A more logical, textually-coherent means to the
same end was unfortunately disregarded. Anti-commandeering
principles, discussed at length below, could have and should have
resolved the issue raised in Alden: by what enumerated power does the
federal government tell state courts which classes of defendants to
exercise jurisdiction over?
A. Freeing the Eleventh Amendment from Its Textual Mooring
A jurisprudential mess is encapsulated in the Court's mantra "we
have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for
what it says, but for the presupposition . . . which it confirms.' 14 To
understand why Alden should not have relied on sovereign immunity
principles derived from the Eleventh Amendment, a brief doctrinal
review is in order. About the only thing uncontroversial about the
proper scope of the Eleventh Amendment is this: Chisholm (finding
that federal judicial power extended to a suit by a non-state citizen
against the sovereign immunity-invoking State of Georgia) was
overruled by it.' 5 Constituting the first, but by no means the last,'6
instance of direct backlash against a Supreme Court opinion, the
13. Alden, 527 U.S. at 746-47, 758-59.
14. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. United States, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (quoting
Blatchford v. Native Viii. of Noatak & Circle Vill., 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991)).
15. Compare Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 420-21, 450-51, 455, 465, 469,
477-78 (1793) (finding in separate opinions that a South Carolina merchant could
maintain a suit against Georgia to collect a debt owed for supplies provided under
contract), with U.S. CONST. amend. XI (tracking the language of Chisholm's
majority holding in removing federal jurisdiction in suits brought by foreign citizens
or citizens of another state against a state); see also JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR. ET AL.,
CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS: ENFORCING THE CONSTITUTION 1-2 (2d ed. 2007)
(describing the Eleventh Amendment as clearly overruling Chisholm).
16. The most famous instance of such backlash is Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment granting citizenship to all persons born or naturalized in the United
States, which overruled the infamous Dred Scott decision finding freed slaves lacked
citizenship under the Constitution. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 413 (1856).
For discussions on the history of the Dred Scott case, see, e.g., Richard L. Aynes, 39
AKRON L. REV. 289, 290-300 (2006); Cass R. Sustein, The Dred Scott Case, 1
GREEN BAG 39, 40-46 (1997).
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Eleventh Amendment was specifically "drafted and ratified in great
haste to overrule Chisholm."17
It was not until nearly one hundred years later' 8 in the landmark
Hans v. Louisiana19 case that the Court would significantly address
the confines of the Eleventh Amendment. Hans became the beacon for
what is now settled law: the Eleventh Amendment encompasses a
principle of state sovereign immunity-namely, that a state cannot be
sued without its consent. 20 The strength of constitutionally-secured
sovereign immunity derives from the Court's willingness to vastly
expand the doctrine beyond constitutional text.2 1 For instance,
although not compelled by Eleventh Amendment text, Hans
unwaveringly held (though not without controversy) 22 that states
17. Lackland H. Bloom, Interpretive Issues in Seminole and Alden, 55 SMu L.
REv. 377, 377 (2002); see also Katherine Florey, Comment, Insufficiently
Jurisdictional: The Case Against Treating State Sovereign Immunity as an Article
III Doctrine, 92 CAL. L. REv. 1375, 1386-87 (2004). For a historical account of the
origin of state sovereign immunity, see MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION:
TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 179-81 (2d ed. 1990).
18. The lapse in time is not entirely surprising given that Congress did not give
lower federal courts federal question jurisdiction until 1875, making the Eleventh
Amendment a largely irrelevant doctrine in most cases. See Louise Weinberg, The
Article III Box: The Power of "Congress" to Attack the "Jurisdiction" of "Federal
Courts," 78 TEX. L. REv. 1405, 1412-13 (2000).
19. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
20. See id. at 16-17; see also Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. United States, 517 U.S.
44, 64 (1996) ("[T]he Eleventh Amendment stood for the constitutional principle
that state sovereign immunity limited the federal courts' jurisdiction under Article
III."). For a criticism of recognizing sovereign immunity in any form, see Erwin
Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REv. 1201 (2001).
21. The Eleventh Amendment states in its entirety "[t]he Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The
seemingly limited context addressed in the Amendment is hardly recognizable
following the line of Supreme Court decisions extending the extra-textual principles
originating in Hans.
22. There has been a strong academic movement to limit the Eleventh
Amendment to diversity-based jurisdiction cases alone, although the proposition has
never commanded a majority of the Court. See, e.g., Louise Weinberg, Of
Sovereignty and Union: The Legends of Alden, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1113,
1133-41 (2001) (noting "[s]ome historians will tell you . . . that if any Eleventh
Amendment case should have been surprising, it was not Chisholm, but Hans");
[Vol. 45
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cannot be compelled to submit to suits brought by private parties in
federal court even if premised on federal question, as opposed to
diversity, jurisdiction.23 Even though the Eleventh Amendment speaks
of suits in "law and equity," which technically does not cover
admiralty actions, In re State of New York found state sovereign
immunity applies in that context as well.24 Perhaps the most
significant case for protecting states' prerogative to avoid suit was
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, which held that Congress may not use its
Article I powers to circumvent the restrictions on federal jurisdiction
imposed by the Eleventh Amendment (as expansively interpreted by
the Court) for lawsuits filed in federal court.25 Though numerous
Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1473-75
(1987) (arguing the Eleventh Amendment is inapplicable to cases invoking federal
question or admiralty jurisdiction); William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation
of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of
Jurisdiction Rather Than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033,
1130 (1983) ("[T]he adopters of the amendment originally had the more modest
purpose of requiring that the state-citizen diversity clause of [A]rticle III be
construed to confer jurisdiction on the federal courts only when a state sued an out-
of-state citizen . . . [therefore,] the amendment left both admiralty and federal
question jurisdiction to operate according to their own terms, authorizing federal
courts to entertain private citizens' suits against the states whenever based on valid
substantive federal law.").
23. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 1, 20-21. Moreover, because states can only act
through their officers, simply suing state officers or agencies without naming the
state as a party defendant will not bar sovereign immunity invocation. Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997) ("It has long been settled that the
reference to actions 'against one of the United States' encompasses not only actions
in which a State is actually named as the defendant, but also certain actions against
state agents and state instrumentalities."); Ex parte Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 492-508
(1887); see also Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 270 (1997)
("The real interests served by the Eleventh Amendment are not to be sacrificed to
elementary mechanics of caption and pleading.").
24. In re State of New York, 256 U.S. 490, 500 (1921); see also Fed. Mar.
Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002) (holding a state may
assert the sovereign immunity defense in an action by a private party brought in a
federal administrative agency tribunal); Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak &
Circle Vill., 501 U.S. 775, 782 (1991) (finding sovereign immunity restricts suits
against states by Indian tribes); Principality of Monaco v. State of Mississippi, 292
U.S. 313, 330-31 (1934) (holding foreign states may not sue a state without its
consent); Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 446-47 (1900) (holding a state may claim
exemption from being sued by a congressionally-created corporation).
25. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. United States, 517 U.S. 44, 72-76 (1996).
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exceptions to the absolute bar on compelling states to submit to suit
remain intact,26 for the most part, Seminole Tribe prevents nearly all
private litigants from forcing a state to pay retrospective monetary
damages stemming from a constitutional violation.27 While Seminole
Tribe arguably proved to be the greatest impenetrable shield of state
immunity, the most surprising foray into expansively interpreting the
reach of Eleventh Amendment-style immunity awaited a case that has
sparked renewed criticism of federalism-driven jurisprudence: cue the
entrance of Alden.
B. Alden's Fixation on State Dignity
Alden picked up where Seminole Tribe left off asking: what
happens when a private party sues a state in state court? 28 Despite the
fact the Eleventh Amendment all but excludes faithful application
outside of federal judicial forums,29 Alden barred private suits against
non-consenting states in state court, myopically focusing on the rights
inherent in sovereignty, rather than probing the source of Congress's
sovereign immunity abrogation power. Alden involved a suit for
monetary damages by probation officers against the State of Maine for
unlawful withholding of overtime wages in contravention of the
Federal Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.30 As Richard Seamon
26. See infra Part V.
27. See Seminole Tribe of Fla., 517 U.S. at 72-76; Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651, 662-63 (1974) ("[A] suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability which
must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh
Amendment."); see also Ana Maria Merico-Stephens, Of Maine's Sovereignty,
Alden's Federalism, and the Myth of Absolute Principles: The Newest Oldest
Question of Constitutional Law, 33 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 325, 376-87 (2000) (arguing
the remaining alternatives after Seminole Tribe are insufficient to protect
constitutional rights); John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional
Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 94-95 (1999) (discussing the right-remedy gap created by
Eleventh Amendment law).
28. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,711-12 (1999).
29. See U.S. CONST. amend XI; Matthew Mustokoff, Sovereign Immunity and
the Crisis of Constitutional Absolutism: Interpreting the Eleventh Amendment After
Alden v. Maine, 53 ME. L. REv. 81, 85 (2001) ("Textually speaking, the Eleventh
Amendment neither discusses nor remotely implicates any judicial forum other than
the federal system.").
30. Alden, 527 U.S. at711.
[Vol. 45
8
California Western Law Review, Vol. 45 [2008], No. 1, Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol45/iss1/2
2008] USING ANTI-COMMANDEERING FOR STATE IMMUNITY 9
points out, the Court seemed to view the question as one of
symmetry-whether "a State's immunity in its own courts [is]
symmetrical to its immunity in federal court."31 Framing the question
in this way, however, led the Court to a lengthy and, as discussed in
other parts of this article, 32 unnecessary focus on the state's
"immunity from private suits central to [its] sovereign dignity."
33
While paying lip service to the limits of federal powers, 34 the
Alden majority suggested that abrogation of state immunity by
Congress was barred by some heretofore undefined "fundamental
postulates implicit in the constitutional design" bestowing an
affirmative constitutional right upon states.35 Matthew Mustokoff
hints at the real driving force stating, "[i]t is paradoxical that the
Eleventh Amendment is referenced so often within the Alden opinion
when one considers that the question presented by the case ... does
not technically raise an Eleventh Amendment issue."36 With Hans
having long ago freed Eleventh Amendment-based sovereign
immunity from any real textual constraints, 37 Justice Kennedy's
decree in Alden that "the sovereign immunity of the States neither
31. Richard H. Seamon, The Asymmetry of State Sovereign Immunity, 76
WASH. L. REv. 1067, 1095-96 (2001).
32. See infra Part III.
33. Alden, 527 U.S. at 715 (emphasis added).
34. See id. at 712 ("We hold that the powers delegated to Congress under
Article I of the United States Constitution do not include the power to subject
nonconsenting States to private suits for damages in state courts."). The rest of the
Court's reasoning belies its claim that a lack of congressional power, rather than a
notion of constitutionally-secured affirmative sovereignty right, formed the rationale
for its holding. Id. at 730-55. As Part IV shows, this is a distinction that has real
consequences for the scope of not only claims implicating sovereign immunity, but
actions involving exclusively non-state parties as well.
35. Alden, 527 U.S. at 728-29; see also Ann Althouse, On Dignity and
Deference: The Supreme Court's New Federalism, 68 U. CIN. L. REv. 245, 250
(2000) (suggesting Alden invokes a states' rights model as opposed to normative
federalism).
36. Matthew Mustokoff, supra note 29, at 85 (emphasis added); accord
Seamon, supra note 31, at 1097-98 (discussing how Alden linked federal court
immunity with state court immunity).
37. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
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derives from nor is limited by the terms of the Eleventh Amendment"
is of no real moment.
38
While it made for a great trip down memory lane complete with
discussions of Framers, Federalist Papers, and original intent,39 Alden
deviated from a framework more appropriate to the question at hand.
Alden should have completed the trilogy that New York v. United
States began. As discussed below at length, New York established the
anti-legislative commandeering principle, Printz v. United States
established the anti-executive commandeering principle, and Alden
should have established the anti-judicial commandeering principle.
The problem is, albeit making passing reference to the anti-
commandeering line of cases,40 Alden based much of its reasoning on
an unstable notion of states' affirmative rights that is both incoherent
and vulnerable to attack. The Court assumed that immunity is a
constitutionally-secured state right (analogous to Bill of Rights
liberties) rather than finding the federal government lacked the power
to abrogate state immunity.4' Should the issue present itself again (as
38. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 713; see also JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR. ET AL., supra
note 15, at 29-30 ("Obviously, Alden rests heavily on Hans, which reflects the same
conception of a preexisting constitutional immunity broader than that specified in
the Eleventh Amendment."); Ana Maria Merico-Stephens, supra note 27, at 367-68
(describing the holding in Alden as just another instance of "Hans rear[ing] its
unsightly head once again to facilitate the ideological bootstrapping the Court is so
determined to turn into an intractable constitutional decree").
39. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 760-64 (Souter, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
majority's reliance on historically-based arguments regarding the constitutionalized
concept of sovereign-inherent immunity from suit); Ernest A. Young, Alden v.
Maine and the Jurisprudence of Structure, 41 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1601, 1620-24
(2000) (describing Alden's argument as "almost wholly a direct appeal to history"
and further insinuating the majority displayed an unwieldy devotion to justifying its
holding on historical grounds); see also Suzanna Sherry, States Are People Too, 75
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1121, 1121 (2000) (repeating a joke that the Y2K bug hit the
Court early making it think it was the year 1900 when it decided Alden v. Maine).
See generally Alden, 527 U.S. at 715-59.
40. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 732-34 (referring to Printz as an "analogous
context" and briefly quoting it for the proposition that congressional laws must be
proper to be constitutional, but then immediately shifting back to a discussion of the
asserted constitutional protection of state sovereign immunity); see also id. at 749-
57 (appearing to invoke an anti-judicial commandeering principle derived from
Printz and New York, but then quickly reverting back to the importance of state
sovereign immunity to state integrity).
41. See Judith Olans Brown & Peter D. Enrich, Nostalgic Federalism, 28
[Vol. 45
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it no doubt will) the Court should shift its focus from state dignity to
federal power, or more specifically the lack thereof, in
commandeering state judiciaries.
II. A Focus ON THE LIMITS OF FEDERAL POWER: THE ANTI-
COMMANDEERING PRINCIPLE
Unlike the technique employed in Alden of fixating on inherently-
bestowed, constitutionally-protected state sovereign rights, New York
v. United States and Printz v. United States established a solid
principle of anti-commandeering. Anti-commandeering is short-hand
for the notion that the federal government, though supreme in its own
sphere of operation, may not constitutionally carry out its powers vis-
a-vis compelled state service. The ensuing brief summary of the
founding anti-commandeering case law provides the structure that this
Article argues should be employed in cases of federal encroachment
of state court jurisdiction (in other words, forcing the state to decide
cases it otherwise would not have under non-discriminatory state law).
A. Anti-Legislative Commandeering (New York v. United States)
New problems with disposing of radioactive waste collided with
old problems of respecting the balance of power between federal and
state governments in New York v. United States.42 In 1980, Congress
passed a law allowing states to enter into regional compacts with other
states to dispose of radioactive waste and charge differential rates for
states not party to the compact.43 However, five years later many
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 15-20 (2000) (suggesting Alden secretly hoped to restore
National League of Cities v. Usery's thoroughly discredited regime of banning
federal regulation of "States qua States" that was overruled by Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority); Ana Maria Merico-Stephens, supra note
27, at 327-28 (describing Alden as the reincarnation of National League of Cities).
For an argument that the Supreme Court should get out of the business of sustaining
the limits of federal power, see Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the
Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 215, 288-93 (2000).
42. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992).
43. Congressional consent was a constitutionally-compelled prerequisite for a
state to be able to create regional state compacts and charge differential rates to non-
member states. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 2 (barring states from imposing
import charges without congressional authorization); U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 3
11
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states had failed to join a compact and, according to the law, could
soon be precluded from shipping waste to existing facilities.44 In
response to the real threat that states would refuse to accept
radioactive waste from states outside of regional compacts (non-
member states), Congress passed the Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Policy Amendments Act of 1985, the subject of the suit in New York
v. United States.45 The goal of the Act was to have each state
eliminate waste generated within the state by either joining a regional
waste-shipping compact, or creating a disposal facility within the
state. To that end, a three-part incentive scheme provided that (1)
surcharges could be imposed on non-member states that would be
redistributed to states meeting specific statutory objectives, (2) states
failing to achieve statutory objectives could be denied waste-disposal
access by states housing disposal facilities, and (3) states that neither
entered into a regional compact nor developed a state facility to
accommodate waste produced within the state by a certain date would
be forced to take title and assume liability for the waste.46
The State of New York brought suit against the United States
challenging each of the three incentive mechanisms. Searching in each
instance for the enumerated power behind the statutory provision, the
Court found the first incentive was "an unexceptional exercise of
Congress's" Commerce Clause and Spending Clause powers to
authorize states to levy surcharges on non-member states and then
redistribute the funds to states meeting milestone achievements.
47
Similarly, the second incentive was within Congress's Commerce
Clause power to allow states to discriminate against interstate
commerce: states failing to join a compact or attain self-sufficiency
were therefore properly subject to "federal regulation authorizing sited
States and regions to deny access to their disposal sites.",48 Unlike the
first two incentives, the third take-title provision was a different
animal. Compelling the state to "choose" between "accepting
(barring states from forming compacts with one another absent congressional
consent).
44. New York, 505 U.S. at 150-51.
45. Id. at 151, 154.
46. See id. at 151-54, 171-77.
47. See id. at 171-73.
48. See id. at 173-74.
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ownership of waste or regulating according to the instructions of
Congress" was beyond Congress's enumerated powers thereby
necessarily impinging on state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth
Amendment. 49  The former alternative was no more than a
congressional directive that states legislatively assume private waste
and its corresponding liability; the latter alternative was no more than
"a simple command to state governments to implement legislation
enacted by Congress. 50  States could not be constitutionally
compelled to select from a menu of "unconstitutionally coercive
regulatory techniques."
5'
The take title-provision thus sparked the announcement of the
anti-commandeering principle, which serves to preserve federalism
and accountability values alike. 52 Addressing the third incentive
mechanism, the New York Court found "[e]ither type of federal action
would 'commandeer' state governments into the service of federal
regulatory purposes, and would for this reason be inconsistent with the
Constitution's division of authority between federal and state
governments., 53 After all, states are their own sovereign entities not
mere "regional offices [or] administrative agencies of the Federal
Government., 54 While Congress could regulate private activity itself
49. See id. at 175-77.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 176.
52. See Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated
Powers": In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 830-31
(1995) (discussing the importance of the Court preserving the federalism system
through review of congressional laws encroaching on state power). If citizens do not
like the laws enacted and implemented, they therefore know which level of
government lawmaker (state or federal) to blame. See William P. Marshall & Jason
S. Cowart, State Immunity, Political Accountability, and Alden v. Maine, 75 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 1069, 1074 (2000) ("Where the Federal Government compels the
States to regulate, the accountability of both state and federal officials is
diminished.").
53. New York, 505 U.S. at 175. The Supreme Court had first hinted that
Congress cannot constitutionally force a state to enact and enforce federal laws in
Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981). While the
law in Hodel was upheld because it gave the states the valid options of regulating or
being preempted by federal law, the anti-commandeering notion would endure.
Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288; see also New York, 505 U.S. at 176 (quoting Hodel, 452
U.S. at 288).
54. New York, 505 U.S. at 188.
13
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or utilize its spending powers to incentivize states to adopt similar
regulations,55 the choice of the Virginia Plan over the New Jersey Plan
at the Convention clearly negated a federal power to empress states
into federal service.56  Encapsulating the newly-minted anti-
commandeering principle, the Court pronounced "[t]he Federal
Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a
federal regulatory program." 57 Perhaps most importantly, the anti-
commandeering principle is impervious to the strength of the federal
interest sought to be advanced through congressional enactments; no
commandeering means no commandeering.
58
B. Anti-Executive Commandeering (Printz v. United States)
New York made Printz v. United States an easy case. Printz
involved an interim provision of the federal Brady Handgun Violence
Prevention Act that required state law enforcement officers to conduct
background checks on individuals attempting to purchase handguns.59
Looking to historical practice and understanding, case precedents, and
constitutional structure, Printz found the anti-commandeering
principle New York announced categorically prohibits state executive
officers from being "'dragooned' [] into administering federal
law.... 60 Just as states may not force the United States executive
branch to administer state law, so too must Congress enforce its own
laws through federal executive officers. Otherwise, Congress could
gratuitously enlist state officials to carry out federal laws with the
corresponding conflation of accountability and drain on state
resources.
61
55. See id. at 166-68.
56. See id. at 165 (noting the adoption of the Virginia Plan was a recognition
that "Congress would exercise its legislative authority over individuals rather than
over States"); accord Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 919-20 (1997).
57. New York, 505 U.S. at 188.
58. Id. at 178 (denying that a strong federal interest can empower Congress to
command the states to regulate); see also Seamon, supra note 8, at 332 (expounding
on the absolute quality of the anti-commandeering principle).
59. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 902-04 (1997).
60. Id. at 905-28, 933.
61. See id. at 928, 930-31.
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Illustrating how Printz is a logical extension of New York, the
Court stated:
We held in New York that Congress cannot compel the States to
enact or enforce a federal regulatory program. Today we hold that
Congress cannot circumvent that prohibition by conscripting the
State's officers directly. The Federal Government may neither issue
directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor
command the States' officers, or those of their political
subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.
It matters not whether policymaking is involved, and no case-by-
case weighing of the burdens or benefits is necessary; such
commands are fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional
system of dual sovereignty.
62
In stark contrast to the lavish attention Alden paid to concepts of state
sovereign immunity, Printz, like New York, kept the attention
correctly focused on the constitutional allocation of powers to the
necessarily limited federal legislative branch.63 After all, people, and
not states, are the ones who ultimately possess affirmative
constitutional rights, and federalism is but a conduit to secure benefits
to these individuals.
64
III. EXTENDING THE ANTI-COMMANDEERING PRINCIPLE
TO STATE COURTS
Which kinds of cases and classes of parties state courts may
preside over is a prerogative of the state that should be impervious to
congressional intrusion absent some constitutionally-compelled
waiver or especially-authorized abrogation power. The power of state
62. Id. at 935.
63. Compare Printz, 521 U.S. at 935, and New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144, 187-88 (1992), with Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 757-60 (1999); see also
Matthew D. Adler, State Sovereignty and the Anti-Commandeering Cases, 574
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sc. 158, 163-64 (2001) (reading the anti-
commandeering cases to only apply to legislative and executive commandeering).
For an extended argument predating Alden for applying Printz and New York to the
state judicial commandeering context, see Seamon, supra note 8.
64. See Florey, supra note 17, at 1412 ("Commentators have routinely decried
the Alden view as an unnecessary personalization of states.... ."). See generally Ann
Althouse, supra note 35, at 260-61.
15
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courts is defined by states themselves and the anti-commandeering
doctrine highlights Congress's inability to broaden state court
jurisdiction, both in the sovereign immunity context and beyond.
Testa merely stands for the rule that once a state decides to exercise
judicial review over particular state causes of action and litigants, that
state may not discriminatorily exclude those same actions and litigants
because federal law forms the basis for suit. Analogously, the
Supremacy Clause requires federal law to reign supreme in cases
properly brought before state courts. The Supremacy Clause in no
way requires state courts to preside over cases or parties that neutral
state law would otherwise prohibit. The anti-commandeering doctrine
yields the same benefits when applied to the judicial branch as it does
when applied to the legislative and executive branches. Anti-
commandeering, and not some notion of constitutionalized state
sovereign immunity, should therefore guide adjudication of sovereign
immunity claims arising in state courts.
A. Sovereign Immunity as Regulating State Court Jurisdiction
Once sovereign immunity is seen for what it really is-a
limitation on judicial power-the applicability of the anti-
commandeering principle to state judiciaries becomes all the more
apparent. This article adopts the definition of "jurisdictional"
propounded by the Supreme Court in Kontrick v. Ryan-something is
"jurisdictional" if it "delineat[es] the classes of cases (subject-matter
jurisdiction) and the persons (personal jurisdiction) falling within a
court's adjudicatory authority." 65 While scholars have debated
whether it partakes more of personal versus subject matter
jurisdiction, consensus coalesces around the view that state sovereign
immunity is in fact a limit on judicial power to adjudicate lawsuits.66
65. Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455 (2004). For an engaging debate on the
correct use of the term 'jurisdictional," see Alex Lees, Note, The Jurisdictional
Label: Use and Misuse, 58 STAN. L. REv. 1457, 1459-60, 1479-81 (2006).
66. See Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 361 n.5 (1990) (noting many Florida
courts found sovereign immunity goes to the jurisdiction of the court to hear the
case); see also United States ex rel. Foulds v. Tex. Tech Univ., 171 F.3d 279, 285-
87 (5th Cir. 1999) (interpreting sovereign immunity to go to subject matter
jurisdiction). Caleb Nelson, for example, marshals an impressive historical argument
for treating sovereign immunity as a personal jurisdiction, as opposed to a subject
matter jurisdiction, concept. See generally Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a
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Moreover, "the [Supreme] Court has frequently stated that the
doctrine, whether or not rooted in the Eleventh Amendment, is either a
limit on subject matter jurisdiction or something closely analogous to
it."' 67 The text of the Eleventh Amendment itself, removing federal
jurisdiction in language mirroring Article III-the source of all federal
jurisdiction-further confirms state sovereign immunity's
jurisdictional character.68 Finally, the Court's willingness to view
federal and state sovereign powers as mirroring one another suggests
states are free to delineate state power by barring claims against them
absent consent.69 Louise Weinberg convincingly argues that Congress
could constitutionally limit federal courts' jurisdiction as it pleases.
Applying Weinberg's logic to the state judicial domain, "[t]hat which
[states] hath power to give, [states] hath power to take away."
70
It is far from a controversial proposition that states have the power
to both establish and define the scope of their courts' authority. 71 As
Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction, 115 HARV. L. REv. 1559 (2002). The
consequences of adopting one jurisdictional view over the other primarily relate to
when the immunity defense claim must first be raised and whether the court has an
obligation to raise it sua sponte. The resolution of the debate, while interesting, has
little impact on the thesis of this article, which deals with how sovereign immunity
in state court suits should be justified to begin with.
67. Florey, supra note 17, at 1385; see also Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,
678 (1974) (stating the sovereign immunity defense "sufficiently partakes of the
nature of a jurisdictional bar so that it need not be raised in the trial court"); accord
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 n.8 (1984).
68. Compare U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 2, cl. 2, with U.S. CONST. amend. XI. See
also United States ex rel. Foulds v. Texas Tech Univ., 171 F.3d 279, 285 n.9 (5th
Cir. 1999) ("[T]he historical context surrounding the enactment of the Eleventh
Amendment supports the position that the Eleventh Amendment, if not part and
parcel of the Article III restrictions, is certainly intertwined with Article III
jurisprudence.").
69. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 928 (1997) (asking whether
states would have the power to compel federal officers to carry out state law to
decide whether Congress had comparable power to compel state officers to
implement federal law).
70. Weinberg, supra note 18, at 1410-11.
71. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 372 (1990) ("The States ... have great
latitude to establish the structure and jurisdiction of their own courts."). See HENRY
ROBERT GLICK & KENNETH V. VINES, STATE COURT SYSTEMS 28-33 (1973)
(discussing the widely varying ways states have chosen to structure their courts); see
also Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Congressional Power and State Court Jurisdiction, 94
GEO. L.J. 949, 968-72 (2006) (confirming through historical analysis that states
17
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the Court has acknowledged, "[T]he States obviously regulate the
ordinary jurisdiction of their courts."72 Whether by legislative
enactment or constitutional amendment, state political entities (or the
people themselves) decide what state courts have the power to do.73
Perhaps more significantly, there is not a single federal statute in the
history of the United States claiming to expand or establish state court
power.74 And, "[i]t is an essential attribute of the States' retained
sovereignty that they remain independent and autonomous within their
proper sphere of authority." 75 Accordingly, state governments, no less
than the federal government, are entitled to decide (within the
boundaries discussed beloW), which matters and parties may be heard
before state tribunals.
B. The Testa Line of Cases and Overcoming the Supremacy Clause
In contrast to state legislative and executive members, the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution imposes specific affirmative
obligations on state judges. Laws made pursuant to the Constitution
"under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of
should have the power to determine the scope of state judicial power). Some states
have acknowledged a form of "inherent powers of the judiciary," that, although not
specifically bestowed, are necessarily conferred upon the state courts. FELIX F.
STUMPF, INHERENT POWERS OF THE COURTS: SWORD AND SHIELD OF THE JUDICIARY
3-15 (1994).
72. Printz, 521 U.S. at 907 n.1 (emphasis added and quotation omitted).
73. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. 5, § 6 (giving state legislatures the unbridled
power to shape trial court jurisdiction with the caveat such jurisdiction must be
uniform throughout the state); TEX. CONST. art 5, § 8 (providing a somewhat
detailed layout of state court jurisdiction within the text of the state constitution);
accord U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 800-02 (1995) (discussing
the powers retained by states under the Constitution).
74. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 744 (1999) (concluding no federal statute
has ever claimed to authorize suits in state courts against non-consenting states); cf.
Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 56-57 (1912) (suggesting that an
attempt by Congress "to enlarge or regulate the jurisdiction of state courts" would be
unconstitutional).
75. Printz, 521 U.S. at 928 (citing Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 725 (1868)).
For a discussion of the threat that many recent federal statutes pose to state court
autonomy, see Georgene M. Vairo, Trends in Federalism and What They Mean for
the State Courts, in STATE COURTS AND FEDERAL AUTHORITY: A THREAT To
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE? 5-24 (Roscoe Pound Inst. ed., 2006).
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the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding. 7 6 Perhaps the most famous Supreme Court case
expounding the effect of the Supremacy Clause on the duties of state
judiciaries is Testa v. Katt, which held that state courts cannot refrain
from adjudicating federal claims brought in state court merely because
the state disagrees with the legislative policies.77 Therefore, Rhode
Island could not refuse to enforce a federal penal statute because a
state's contradictory views on federal substantive law cannot form a
"valid excuse" for failing to entertain federal claims.78
While New York and Printz heavily cite to Testa to show the
comparative lack of constitutional impositions on state legislative and
executive officials, Testa is nothing more than a federal discrimination
prohibition: a state cannot avoid hearing federal suits in its courts
when "[that] same type of claim arising under state law would be
enforced by that [s]tate's courts., 79 In a sense, Testa and its progeny
track the rational-basis review doctrines applied in other constitutional
arenas.80 A state may limit the kinds of cases and classes of parties it
exercises power over, but it may not do so for illegitimate reasons.
8'
76. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (emphases added); see also Printz, 521 U.S.
at 907 (stating the Constitution imposed prescriptions on state judges, but not state
executive members); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 178-79 (1992)
(distinguishing state courts from state legislatures on the ground that the
Constitution directly commands judicial enforcement of federal law).
77. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 392-94 (1947).
78. Id. at 392-93.
79. Id. at 393; see also Seamon, supra note 8, at 351 ("The Supremacy Clause
is offended only when the state allows its courts to hear a state-law claim but
prohibits them from hearing a federal claim arising from the same facts.").
80. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-91
(1955) (contending that state legislatures are free to pass certain economic
regulations so long as they have some legitimate basis for doing so); see also
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorizing and
Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 293, 296 (1992) ("If the standard is rationality, the
government is supposed to win-and any lawyer who hires expert witnesses to
dispute the empirical basis for legislation under this standard of review is wasting
the client's money."); Neelum J. Wadhwani, Note, Rational Reviews, Irrational
Results, 84 TEX. L. REV. 801, 802 (2006) (describing the presumption of
constitutionality the doctrine of rational basis entails).
81. See Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Federal Regulation of State Court Procedures,
110 YALE L.J. 947, 972 (2001) ("[T]he Judges Clause does not provide Congress
19
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Discriminatorily keeping federal claims out of state court is simply not
a legitimate state purpose. Professor Seamon describes the state of
affairs mandated by Testa as follows:
rT]he Testa cases establish that the Supremacy Clause, of its own
force, (1) invalidates state laws that require or permit state courts to
discriminate against federal claims; and (2) requires state courts to
hear federal claims that they have power to hear under the state law
that remains intact when any discriminatory state laws are
disregarded. Apart from invalidating such discriminatory state laws,
the Supremacy Clause does not enlarge the jurisdiction of state
courts. Thus, the Supremacy Clause, standing alone, would not
compel a state court to hear a private federal claim against its own
state if state law barred the state courts from hearing any private
claim against the state. The Clause would, however, compel a state
court to hear a federal claim against a state if state law waived the
state's immunity in its courts from a state-law claim arising on the
same facts as did the federal claim. 82
Howlett v. Rose confirms the anti-discriminatory principle of the
Supremacy Clause setting forth three parameters for determining
whether a state's refusal to adjudicate a federal claim in state court
violates the Constitution: First, absent a "valid excuse" state courts
may not decline to hear a federally-authorized suit; if jurisdiction
exists, courts have a duty to exercise it. 83 Second, trying to distance
state courts from federal law because of "disagreement with its
with an independent font of authority over state courts; it merely directs state courts
to enforce federal laws validly enacted under another congressional power.").
82. Seamon, supra note 8, at 335.
83. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 369-70 (1990) (quoting Douglas v. New
York, 279 U.S. 377, 387-88 (1929)); see, e.g., Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 394
(1947) (holding a state court could not decline to exercise pre-existing jurisdiction
because the plaintiff sought to enforce a federal right); McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F.
Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 230, 232-34 (1934) (compelling a state court to hear a federal
claim because the jurisdiction of the court encompassed the suit and the parties
before it under state law); cf Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (1912)
("[T]his court can doubtless compel the state courts to exercise in aid of the new
Federal right such jurisdiction as those courts have under state laws." (emphases
added)). See generally MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN
THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 172-78 (2d ed. 1990) (reviewing the "valid
excuse" doctrine of state court jurisdiction abstention).
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content or a refusal to recognize the superior authority of its source"
can never be a "valid excuse." 84 Third, "[w]hen a state court refuses
jurisdiction because of a neutral state rule regarding the
administration of the courts, [reviewing courts] must act with utmost
caution before deciding that it is obligated to entertain the claim."85 In
accordance with these guidelines, states have been found to have the
power to refuse to hear a case when state law applying to both federal
and state claims alike insisted at least one party be a state resident,
86
required the claim to have arisen in particular territorial limits, 87 or
directed the case be dismissed under the doctrine of forum non
conveniens. 
88
C. The Rationales of New York and Printz Apply with
Equal Force to the State Judiciary
Accountability and resource depletion have been identified by the
Court and scholars as harms flowing from federal commandeering of
state political entities. 89 Forcing a state court to adjudicate cases that
would otherwise be barred by neutral state law creates the same
problems. Most importantly, when the federal government commands
state courts to throw open their doors to cases otherwise barred, state
and not federal government officials are likely to be punished if the
electorate disagrees with the results. Deciding additional cases will
force legislatures to either allocate more money to the state judiciary
or allow the justice system to become incrementally slower than it
would have otherwise been. As Professor Seamon notes, "[e]ither
84. See Howlett, 496 U.S. at 371-72 (explaining that policy is established
nationwide when enacted by Congress pursuant to valid constitutional powers).
85. Id. at 372 (emphases added).
86. Douglas v. New York, 279 U.S. 377, 387 (1929).
87. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 121-23 (1945).
88. Missouri ex rel. S. Ry. Co. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1950); see also
Howlett, 496 U.S. at 374-75 (discussing Douglas v. New York, Herb v. Pitcairn, and
Missouri ex rel. Southern Railway Co. v. Mayfield with approval). Overall, these
cases establish that "a state may neutrally control the volume and types of cases that
its courts can hear." Seamon, supra note 8, at 340.
89. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1992); Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 929-31 (1997); see also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,
749-52 (1999); Bellia, supra note 81, at 956-57; Seamon, supra note 8, at 363-66.
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route would cause state residents to blame members of the state
legislature, rather than members of Congress, for the increase in costs
or the decrease in efficiency." 90 Aside from draining judicial resources
by deciding cases otherwise excludable, voters may wonder why
states have authorized proceedings against the state for money that
will come from public coffers to begin with and vote accordingly. 91 In
addition to indirect electoral responses felt by the state legislature,
state court judges are not immune from political pressure either.
Unlike Article III federal judges who are appointed for life during
good behavior, 92 over three-fourths of state judges are selected by
popular election.
93
Judicial commandeering puts the same strain on state resources as
legislative or executive commandeering. "Simply put, the more time
and money that Congress require[s] state courts to devote to hearing
federal cases, the less the courts would have for hearing state cases."
94
There is no reason to think "[c]ongressional commandeering of state
courts could [not] consume just as much state energy as could
congressional commandeering of the other branches of state
government."95 The costs of adjudicating claims are part and parcel of
policy implementation budgeting. There is a real danger that the
federal government will abuse the ability to provide benefits without
needing to overtly tax the general public to cover the expense of
judicially administering regulatory programs. 96 Further, as experience
90. Seamon, supra note 8, at 364; accord Alden, 527 U.S. at 750-52 (arguing
that the political process should guide resource allocation and federal
commandeering of state courts would usurp that process).
91. Marshall & Cowart, supra note 52, at 1080-81.
92. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
93. Tonya M. Gray, Note, Separate but Not Sovereign: Reconciling Federal
Commandeering of State Courts, 52 VAND. L. REV. 143, 163 (1999) (discussing the
political character of state courts).
94. Seamon, supra note 8. at 363; see also TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 311.034
(Vernon 2007) ("In order to preserve the legislature's interest in managing state
fiscal matters through the appropriations process, a statute shall not be construed as
a waiver of sovereign immunity unless the waiver is effected [sic] by clear and
unambiguous language.").
95. Seamon, supra note 8, at 364.
96. See New York v. Printz, 521 U.S. 898, 930 (1997) (discussing the free rider
problem associated with forcing states to administer federal programs).
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has shown,97 the "line between that which is 'judicial' and that which
is 'executive' is not always easy to draw," and Printz clearly forbids
executive members from being converted into puppets of the federal
government.
98
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF ADOPTING THE ANTI-COMMANDEERING
PRINCIPLE IN PLACE OF THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
The following hypothetical statutes are designed to colorfully
illustrate the implications and constitutional issues arising from
substituting flawed notions of constitutionalized sovereign immunity
in place of the established doctrine of anti-commandeering. The Wal-
Mart hypothetical statute purposefully stretches the limits of state
power to define the parties over which a court may exercise
jurisdiction. The lesson to take away is that anti-commandeering has
the potential to place less constraint on state power than the Alden
jurisprudence contemplates. In contrast, the University of Texas
hypothetical statute portrays the consequences of adopting anti-
judicial commandeering as the guiding principle in sovereign
immunity battles. As demonstrated, Testa and its progeny will result
in more restrictions on what the state may permissibly do to keep from
being an unwilling defendant in its own state courts.
A. Limiting State Court Power over Ordinary Defendants:
Wal-Mart Hypothetical Statute
The following hypothetical statute tests the limits of the anti-
commandeering doctrine in permitting a state to restrict the kinds of
parties or causes of action that may be brought before state tribunals.
This statute is for illustrative purposes only-to show how anti-
commandeering analysis is used to address state laws that have the
effect of denying jurisdiction over some federal claims.9 9 On April 15,
97. G. Edward White, Historicizing Judicial Scrutiny, 57 S.C. L. REv. 1, 16-35
(2005) (examining cases that floundered in distinguishing between "executive" and
"legislative" functions that were theoretically immune from judicial review).
98. Bellia, supra note 81, at 988.
99. For another example of the use of a hypothetical statute for instruction
rather than policy reform, see Jarrod Forster Reich, "No Provincial or Transient
Notion": The Need for a Mistake of Age Defense in Child Rape Prosecutions, 57
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2007, the Texas Legislature passed the following law with the popular
title "Keeping Wal-Mart's Prices Low Tort Reform Act of 2007": 100
The Legislature finds that Wal-Mart is a good corporate citizen and
has been subjected to unfair media portrayal in recent years.
Because of said negative media coverage, individuals have been
encouraged to sue Wal-Mart for often frivolous tort claims. Due to
the rising costs of such litigation in the State of Texas, Wal-Mart
has been forced to raise prices in all of its Texas stores. The
Legislature has determined that it is in the best interest of the
people of Texas to ensure that Wal-Mart remains a source of low-
priced merchandise. Without Wal-Mart many individuals might not
otherwise have access to low-cost retail goods.
The purpose of this Act is to ensure that all Texas citizens are able
to enjoy low, low prices at Wal-Mart retail stores. This purpose can
be accomplished by granting Wal-Mart the equivalent of
government sovereign immunity in any lawsuit sounding in tort
filed in a Texas state court irrespective of whether the claim is
brought under state or federal law. And because in Texas sovereign
immunity removes subject matter jurisdiction, no state court will
have the power to hear such claims.
Under the anti-commandeering doctrine propounded at length above,
would a state court's refusal to hear a federal-based tort claim for
monetary damages against Wal-Mart under the hypothetical Wal-Mart
Act be unconstitutional?' 0 '
VAND. L. REV. 693, 964-97 (2004) (explaining the outrageous consequences flowing
from passing a hypothetical statute that the author then argues stem from a real
statute).
100. Some of the language was adopted from real statutes such as the
Improving America's Schools Act of 1994, 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2007), and the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2007).
101. For purposes of this hypothetical, the due process implications are
ignored. Some of the ramifications of removing all judicial forums will be discussed
later in the article. See infra Part V. Also, it is assumed that the law does not violate
any of the provisions of the Texas Constitution. Finally, for simplicity's sake it is
assumed the Wal-Mart Act is self-executing, that is, § 1983 need not be used to
authorize a private party to initiate a lawsuit.
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Starting from the proposition that states "obviously regulate the
ordinary jurisdiction of their courts[,]J" 0 2 removing a specific party
(Wal-Mart) from the jurisdiction of state courts seems consistent with
residual state powers. Looking to the Supremacy Clause limits, as
delineated in the Testa line of cases, 10 3 Texas likely has a "valid
excuse" for enacting the Wal-Mart Tort Reform Act-furthering the
economic well-being of its citizens. Unless the legislature's stated
purpose was a pretext for discrimination against federal tort law (and
we have no reason to believe it was), reviewing courts are unlikely to
force Texas to retract its jurisdictional limit on tort cases against Wal-
Mart. Essential to the Act's constitutionality, Texas was willing to
forgo lawsuits against Wal-Mart under both state and federal law.
104
Had Texas conferred jurisdiction over cases against Wal-Mart
sounding in state tort law, it would have had to grant jurisdiction on an
equal basis for federal tort claims. Assuming the legislation comports
with the Bill of Rights, a state, like Congress, has plenary power to
control access to its courts.10 5 Applying the anti-commandeering
doctrine, Congress is absolutely barred from compelling state courts to
throw open their doors to Wal-Mart tort suits, unless, as explained in
Part V, Texas has consented (the Act negates this) or the Constitution
authorizes congressional abrogation (Article I Commerce Clause
powers, the likely source of such tort law, does not authorize this).
Applying the Howlett three-part test,106 the Keeping Wal-Mart's
Prices Low Tort Reform Act of 2007 does not appear to be
constitutionally infirm.
Absent valid waiver or abrogation, our hypothetical jurisdiction-
removing statute leaves Congress powerless to demand the state
employ its state judiciary to enforce federal tort law. However, the
availability of some court to hear federal tort suits against Wal-Mart is
not hindered at all. If Congress wants to authorize individuals to sue
102. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 907 n. 1 (1997) (quotation omitted).
103. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
104. This discrimination inquiry closely parallels analysis in other areas of
constitutional law. For example, Virginia was under no obligation to establish a
state-funded, military university; however, once it did, it was unconstitutional to
exclude females from the school on the basis of their gender. See United States v.
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 519, 534, 545-46, 557-58 (1996).
105. See Weinberg, supra note 18, at 1410-16.
106. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
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Wal-Mart, it can. The only catch is that federal courts will be the only
available forum. And what about the Eleventh Amendment that posed
so much trouble for individuals trying to sue states in federal court?
For all its textual infidelities, the Supreme Court has read the Eleventh
Amendment to only apply to suits against state entities.'0 7 Wal-Mart
can therefore be forced to submit to a suit seeking monetary recovery
in federal court, the indignity of the experience notwithstanding. The
important point is that while states' ability to control their courts'
jurisdiction is greater under an anti-commandeering versus a
sovereign-rights based doctrine, federal claims (the real source of
worry since states can simply remove and/or fail to grant state law
causes of action) are just as likely to have a chance to be heard, at
least against nongovernmental entities.
B. Limiting State Court Power over Non-Consenting States:
University of Texas Hypothetical Statute
The next hypothetical statute illustrates the consequences of
adopting the anti-commandeering framework in the precise situation
that arose in Alden v. Maine: a federal claim for retrospective,
monetary relief against a non-consenting state filed in state court. 08
This faux statute comes with the same caveats as the Wal-Mart
hypothetical-the goal is to evaluate the constitutionality and effects
of adopting an anti-commandeering approach to Alden-like claims, not
to make normative suggestions about state jurisdictional legislation.
That being said, on April 15, 2007, the Texas Legislature enacted the
"Stabilizing the University of Texas Law School's Tuition Tort
Reform Act of 2007": 109
107. See, e.g., Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274,
280-81 (1977) (noting only state entities and "arm[s] of the State" are covered by the
Eleventh Amendment); Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890)
(holding "[lhe [E]leventh [A]mendment limits the jurisdiction only as to suits
against a state[,]" which did not include municipal corporations).
108. In reality, this hypothetical statute would be superfluous: Texas law
already prohibits suits against states unless a constitutional or statutory provision
unequivocally waives sovereign immunity. See Holland v. City of Houston, 41 F.
Supp. 2d 678, 710 (S.D. Tex. 1999); accord Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d
325, 344-46 (Tex. 2006).
109. Again, the statutory language was borrowed in small part from actual
statutes like the Improving America's Schools Act of 1994, 20 U.S.C. § 6301
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The Legislature finds that the University of Texas Law School
provides high-quality legal training to future Texas lawyers at a
very reasonable price. In the past five years, there has been a
marked increase in suits filed against the University of Texas Law
School by private Texas law schools alleging unfair price
competition, mostly under state law. Also, a new clinic called the
University of Texas Sovereign Immunity Law Clinic has brought
slews of state law actions against the University of Texas Law
School. While providing great in-court training for University of
Texas law students, the suits are costing the Law School a fortune
to defend. If the barrage of lawsuits does not end, the University of
Texas will be forced to raise law school tuition, which threatens
Texas's goal of providing low-cost, high-quality legal education to
all students.
The purpose of this Act is to ensure that the University of Texas
Law School continues to be able to charge students low tuition rates
so everyone admitted can afford to attend. This purpose can be
accomplished by extending the University of Texas Law School
full sovereign immunity rights for any tort suit seeking
retrospective, monetary remedies irrespective of whether the claim
is brought under state or federal law. Sovereign immunity removes
subject matter jurisdiction under Texas law, so state courts lack the
power to hear such claims.
Could Texas state courts now constitutionally refuse to hear
federal tort claims requesting monetary relief from the University of
Texas Law School pursuant to the hypothetical University of Texas
Law School Act?110
Texas has likely exercised its power within the boundaries of the
Constitution in effectively removing state court jurisdiction over
compensatory tort claims against the University of Texas Law School.
A state, no less than Congress, can choose to bar state courts from
hearing compelled tort suits against it.'' As with the Wal-Mart Act,
(2007), and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2007).
110. This hypothetical does not address due process considerations and takes
as a given that the law would not violate the Texas Constitution. Also, this
hypothetical presumes some other federal statute besides § 1983 authorizes a suit for
damages since § 1983 does not permit suits against states. See Will v. Mich. Dep't
of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989).
111. A state university is "an arm of the State" and is therefore entitled to
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the University of Texas Act has a rational, non-discriminatory
purpose-keeping law school tuition in check. While some federal
suits may be barred, nothing denotes that the motivation behind the
Act was to keep federal claims out of state court. While the language
of the legislation suggests it may be discriminatory against state law
actions, the rationale in Testa for banning state disapproval of the
content of federal laws is that Congress sets policy for all of the
United States. In contrast, there is nothing in the Testa line of cases or
the Supremacy Clause that suggests states cannot discriminate against
their own state law claims. If leaving a state entity vulnerable to state
claims is detrimental to the state (or a reasonable legislature could
believe so), 112 there is no constitutional prohibition on removing state
judicial power to entertain claims against that state entity: a valid
excuse will create a strong presumption of constitutionality.' 13
Lacking waiver and abrogation power under Article I, Congress
cannot force Texas to grant jurisdiction to its state courts to adjudicate
federal tort claims brought against the University of Texas Law
School. Therefore, the Stabilizing the University of Texas Law
School's Tuition Tort Reform Act of 2007 is a valid exercise of
Texas's legislative powers.
Whereas denying state court jurisdiction over non-state
defendants merely had the effect of channeling federal tort claims
brought by individuals into federal court, barring jurisdiction over
non-consenting state defendants makes monetary recovery on federal
tort claims impossible unless Congress is willing and able to abrogate
immunity under an applicable enumerated power (even if Eleventh
Amendment immunity is abrogated the claim must be filed in federal
court). While state entities may be granted total immunity from
monetary liability for federal claims under the anti-commandeering
framework, that immunity comes at a price: states must withhold
jurisdiction for equivalent federal and state claims alike (equal claims
must be treated equally). In contrast, the Alden approach with its
emphasis on the dignity of state sovereignty would seem to permit
challenge claims on the basis of state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment. See Raygor v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533, 535
(2002); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 430-31 (1997).
112. See sources cited supra note 80 and accompanying text.
113. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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states to preferentially waive immunity to submit to suits under state,
but not federal law (as long as it was in practice and not through
explicit discriminatory legislation). At the very least, it is less certain
that the Supremacy Clause would trump the constitutionalized state
sovereign immunity right under the analysis used in Alden. Perhaps
the neutrality restriction on invoking state sovereign immunity will
force states that want to consent to state claims to consent to federal
claims as well, making it easier for individuals to sue states for
monetary damages. Moreover, unlike in the Alden world of state
affirmative dignity-based rights, the neutrality principle incorporated
into the anti-judicial commandeering doctrine also means that
individuals could choose to bring suit in federal or state court when
the state consents to be sued in a class of cases (with state and federal
causes of action being waived or not waived equally).
V. SUING THE STATE WITHOUT GETTING CONSENT: METHODS OF
LAST RESORT (COMING TO A FEDERAL COURT NEAR YOU)
While doctrinal differences between the anti-commandeering
principle of New York and Printz and the affirmative state rights
model of Alden were expounded above, there are exceptions to
Eleventh Amendment state sovereign immunity that would apply
regardless of the adjudicatory method employed." 14 These exceptions
include retrospective, equitable relief; suits brought by government
rather than individual parties; individualized or across-the-board claim
and/or party-based waivers of immunity; congressional abrogation
under the Fourteenth Amendment Section 5 enforcement power or the
Article I Bankruptcy Clause; and possibly (although not firmly
established) suits alleging procedural due process violations from
barring a suit from being brought in a specific forum. These types of
suits may all be brought against a state in federal court without
violating the commands of the Eleventh Amendment (which apply in
federal, but not state forums).
114. While the Eleventh Amendment itself is only applicable in federal court
(Alden transports its principles, but does not purport to apply the Amendment
directly to suits brought in state court), exceptions to the Eleventh Amendment
preserve a forum for adjudicating many federal claims-the most striking
consequence of applying state sovereign immunity.
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A. Retrospective, Equitable Remedies (Ex parte Young)
Throughout the article, suits against defendants claiming
immunity and/or a lack of jurisdiction were all assumed to be seeking
retrospective, monetary relief. 115 Ex parte Young is probably the most
frequently utilized exception to the sovereign immunity bar under the
Eleventh Amendment-suits against state officials (otherwise
protected by state immunity) seeking prospective (forward-looking),
equitable (usually commanding the official to do or refrain from doing
something) remedies are not barred.1 6 Ex parte Young indulges in the
fiction that state officers are stripped of their state character when they
violate a court-issued injunction forbidding future unconstitutional
behavior. 117 However, the Supreme Court has kept the doctrine
narrowly defined and suits for monetary recovery against the state for
past harm may not be adjudicated in federal court absent waiver or
proper congressional abrogation." 
8
115. See supra text accompanying note 2.
116. See sources cited infra note 117.
117. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 149-51, 159-61, 168 (1908)
(punishing the Attorney General-Edward T. Young-for violating a federal court
order enjoining the enforcement of an unconstitutional state price-fixing law); see
also JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., ET AL., supra note 15, at 12 (describing the outcome and
significance of Ex parte Young); Jesse H. Choper & John C. Yoo, Who's Afraid of
the Eleventh Amendment? The Limited Impact of the Court's Sovereign Immunity
Rulings, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 213, 225-26 (2006) (discussing the legal fiction behind
Ex parte Young). Suits against officers in their individual capacity, so long as funds
are not certain to come from the state treasury, are also allowable under Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence. See id.
118. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668 (1974) (barring relief "measured in
terms of a monetary loss resulting from a past breach of a legal duty on the part of
the defendant state officials"); accord Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521
U.S. 261, 264, 280-88 (1997) (refusing to apply the Ex parte Young fiction and
accordingly dismissing the action on Eleventh Amendment grounds when the
plaintiff tribe had essentially requested a quiet title action in the form of injunctive
relief). The one exception to the prohibition of monetary relief is for violations of
prospective injunctions-Ex parte Young provides for damages of that sort. See
Jesse H. Choper & John C. Yoo, Effective Alternatives to Causes of Action Barred
by the Eleventh Amendment, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 715, 720-21 (2005).
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B. Suits by the United States or an Individual State in Its Own Court
United States v. Texas decreed that a suit by the United States
against a state or a suit between two states is cognizable in federal
court because states submitted to such jurisdiction by ratifying the
Constitution. 1 9 Choper and Yoo contend that sovereign immunity was
always understood to prevent lawsuits "brought by private individuals
against state governments."' 120  Thus "[t]o avoid the Eleventh
Amendment," Choper and Yoo explain, "the national government
itself need only bring more enforcement actions against states or move
to intervene in privately filed suits."'121 As they point out, however,
"[s]ince Congress has not taken any of these steps since Seminole
Tribe and Alden, it would seem that the political will does not
currently exist to expand the level of federal enforcement of various
constitutional and statutory provisions against the states.' 22 As an
independent sovereign entity, a state may also sue another state
without needing consent in its own state courts.
123
C. Waivers: Dole Incentivizing/Political Pressure
Unlike traditional subject matter jurisdiction requirements,
sovereign immunity may be waived by states either on a case-by-case
basis, or pursuant to statutory or constitutional provisions; however,
such waiver must be explicit. 24 "Sovereign immunity bars suit only in
the absence of consent." 125 Congress may constitutionally incentivize
states (it is uncertain at what point incentives become coercion
119. See United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 645-46 (1892); see also JOHN
C. JEFFRIES, JR., ET AL., supra note 15, at 31 (stating Alden acknowledged it is
"settled doctrine that in the original Constitution, the states had surrendered their
immunity from suit by other states or by the United States").
120. Choper & Yoo, supra note 117, at 233.
121. Id.; accord Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755-57 (1999); Employees of
the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare of Mo. v. Dep't of Pub. Health and Welfare of
Mo., 411 U.S. 279, 286 (1973).
122. Choper & Yoo, supra note 117, at 235.
123. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 411-12, 425-27 (1979).
124. See Choper & Yoo, supra note 117, at 259-60. See generally Christina
Bohannan, Beyond Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity: State Waivers, Private
Contracts, and Federal Incentives, 77 N.Y.U.L. REv. 273 (2002).
125. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 (1999).
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though) to submit to suits by private individuals using its plenary
Spending Clause power. 126 The power of the purse is significant
because, as Choper and Yoo point out, given that South Dakota v.
Dole'27 is still good law, "Congress [can] simply require states that
receive federal funds to waive their sovereign immunity in any lawsuit
brought to enforce a constitutional or statutory right."'1 28 Also,
political pressure to compensate injured citizens for government
wrongdoing may explain the persistence of many state waivers (albeit
limited) for tort suits.1 29 Similarly, economic pressure to contract on
equal terms with other market players probably explains why the vast
majority of states waive sovereign immunity for suits involving
government contracts.' 
30
D. Congressional Abrogation and Due Process (Fourteenth
Amendment Section 5 Enforcement and Bankruptcy Article I Powers)
The first in a long line of abrogation cases, Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer
held that "Congress has the power to authorize Federal courts to enter
[money damages for private individuals against a state government] as
a means of enforcing the substantive guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment., 131 Thus Congress can pass legislation requiring states to
submit to suits in federal court to enforce Fourteenth Amendment
mandates; the later-in-time principle means that the Eleventh
Amendment is necessarily qualified by the Fourteenth Amendment. 1
32
Congress must overcome several hurdles to successfully abrogate
state sovereign immunity: First, the proper source of power must be
126. See id.; see also Choper & Yoo, supra note 118, at 723-24.
127. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
128. Choper & Yoo, supra note 118, at 724. Alternatively, "Congress could
attach as a condition to federal funding that states offer their own remedial process
for violations of federal rights." Id.
129. See id. at 725-27.
130. Id.
131. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 447-48, 455-57 (1976) (emphasis
added).
132. See Choper & Yoo, supra note 117, at 259-60; see also U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 5 ("Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of [the Fourteenth Amendment]" (emphasis added)); City of Boerne
v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 528-29 (1997).
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relied upon in enacting the abrogating legislation. Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment along with the recent addition of the Article I
Bankruptcy Clause are the only sources of power Congress may
employ to abrogate immunity. 133 Second, while Fitzpatrick remains
good law, the Court has required Congress to be extremely clear in its
intent to abrogate state sovereignty.' 34 Moreover, implementing the
Seminole Tribe rule that Congress lacks the power to abrogate state
sovereign immunity under general Article I powers, City of Boerne v.
Flores directs courts to determine whether "[t]here [is] a congruence
and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied
and the means adopted to that end."'131 If not, the abrogation is invalid
and the case will be dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds.
136
Finally, while not currently embraced by the Supreme Court,
Professor Seamon makes a compelling argument that states consented
to be sued in their own courts for alleged due process violations, in
particular, for violations of the Just Compensation Clause.'
37
133. A good rule of thumb is that if the right would receive heightened scrutiny
under the Supreme Court's individual rights regime, then congressional law
abrogating state immunity is much more likely to be upheld. See Tennessee v. Lane,
541 U.S. 509 (2004) (upholding Title II legislation abrogating state immunity for
suits by disabled individuals denied courthouse access-a fundamental right); Nev.
Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (upholding Congress's
authorization of money damages for violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act
family-care provision because gender discrimination is a concern of the Equal
Protection Clause and there was evidence of widespread discrimination); cf Kimel
v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (rejecting abrogation of state immunity
under a federal law barring age discrimination noting age is not a suspect class); Fla.
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999)
(denying a congressional abrogation power to protect procedural due process in
patent infringement suits). Drawing heavily on historical arguments, Central
Virginia Community College v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006), recently held that states
consented to suit in bankruptcy proceedings observing that Congress is instructed to
make "uniform" bankruptcy laws, which implies state waiver. For a detailed
discussion of the Katz case, see Anthony J. Enright, Note, The Originalist's
Dilemma: Katz and the New Approach to the State Sovereign Immunity Defense, 81
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1553 (2006).
134. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238-41 (1985).
135. Flores, 521 U.S. at 520, 526 ("Any suggestion that Congress has a
substantive, non-remedial power under the Fourteenth Amendment is not supported
by our case law.").
136. Id.
137. See Seamon, supra note 31, at 1069-70.
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CONCLUSION
Alden v. Maine took the wrong approach in answering a
politically-sensitive question: when can a state court refuse to hear an
otherwise valid federal claim? The anti-commandeering principle
announced in New York and Printz should have been the framework
used to decide the state sovereignty claim dilemma in Alden, thereby
keeping the interpretively-suspect Eleventh Amendment out of state
court. Utilizing anti-judicial commandeering jurisprudence would not
only avoid applying a dubious set of state affirmative rights principles,
but would also preserve political accountability and prevent misuse of
limited government resources. The Supremacy Clause and the cases
executing it do not require states to expand their neutral, jurisdiction-
limiting laws, but do require that state courts not abstain from
deciding cases against any set of claims or defendants in order to
avoid implementing federal policy. Thus, if a state court exercises
jurisdiction over certain state claims or parties suing under state law, it
must grant jurisdiction for similarly-situated federal claims or parties
suing under federal law. Adopting the anti-judicial commandeering
approach to deciding claims of state sovereign immunity made in state
court in some ways expands and in some ways shrinks a state's ability
to implement its jurisdictional preferences. Finally, some access to
federal courts is ensured under either the Alden or anti-judicial
commandeering scheme as neither the affirmative state sovereign
rights jurisprudence nor the anti-judicial commandeering principle
alter the many existing exceptions to the Eleventh Amendment bar on
suits brought in federal court against non-consenting states.
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